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Shinto, Immanence, and Discursive Secularization
Aike P. Rots
This article analyzes contemporary Shinto ideology in the light of recent 
theories on the formation of the category “secular” and on secularization. 
Drawing on Charles Taylor’s discussion of the original meaning of the 
categories “religious” and “secular,” as well as the work of Kuroda Toshio and 
others, it suggests that premodern shrine worship may have been perceived 
as the “immanent,” “this-worldly” counterpart of a more transcendentally 
oriented monastic Buddhism. In the Meiji period, Shinto developed into 
a modern Japanese “immanent frame” (or “Shinto secular,” as Josephson 
has called it)—a public, collective, non-optional frame of reference—
while Buddhism, Christianity, and “new religions” were configured as 
“religious,” that is, private and optional. Contemporary Shinto leaders such 
as Tanaka Tsunekiyo and Sonoda Minoru draw upon such Meiji-period 
understandings of Shinto as the immanent, foundational framework by 
which Japanese culture and society are shaped and conditioned. According 
to them, Shinto should not be subject to the same legal restrictions as other 
religions, as it is an essentially public tradition uniting communities (kyōdōtai) 
around their shared sacred center, the shrine grove (chinju no mori). As this 
article demonstrates, these authors actively contribute to Shinto’s discursive 
secularization: they seek to dissociate Shinto from “religion,” instead framing 
it as Japan’s underlying “traditional culture” (dentō bunka). Rather than 
challenging the postwar legal state apparatus and separation of religion 
and state, therefore, they seek to renegotiate Shinto’s position within this 
apparatus, asserting its role as a “secular” worship tradition concerned with 
the common good of the nation as a whole. 
Keywords: Chinju no mori, “immanent frame,” public space, sacralization, 
secularism, Shinto environmentalist paradigm, “Shinto secular,” shrine 
communities, Sonoda Minoru, Tanaka Tsunekiyo
In recent years, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s 安倍晋三 plans to change the Constitution 
of Japan have received ample media attention. In particular, his efforts to adapt and/or 
reinterpret Article 9 in a way that allows for more Japanese military involvement in foreign 
conflicts have been subjected to much scrutiny and protest, in Japan as well as abroad. Yet 
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Abe’s proposed constitutional changes are not limited to Article 9. One significant legal-
political change, instigated by the Abe government, concerns the constitutionally stipulated 
separation of state and religion. Although Japan remains a country with comparatively strict 
laws when it comes to state support for religious institutions, the boundaries of the category 
“religion”—which have been subject to negotiation ever since the implementation of the 
category in the Meiji period—are being actively redrawn, and some practices previously 
classified as “religious” are currently reframed as “culture,” “tradition,” or “heritage.” 
Supported by powerful conservative lobby groups, Abe has been actively involved with the 
reintroduction of Shinto and imperial symbols and rituals into the public realm, leading to 
their “deprivatization” and, it may be argued, a renewed “sacralization” of the nation and 
land of Japan.1
Central to these initiatives are the Ise Shrines, generally regarded as the most sacred site 
of Shinto, where sun goddess and divine ancestress of the imperial family Amaterasu 天照 
is enshrined. Significantly, in 2013, Abe participated in an important shrine ritual in the 
context of Ise’s ritual rebuilding (shikinen sengū 式年遷宮), which takes place every twenty 
years. The myth of Ise as the leading imperial, “non-Buddhist,” “eternal” sacred site in the 
country played a central role in Meiji-period “State Shinto” ideology, and continues to be 
cherished by Shinto leaders and conservatives. Accordingly, the uninterrupted continuation 
of ritual practices, including the costly shikinen sengū, constitutes one of the Shinto 
establishment’s core priorities.2 Not surprisingly, then, shrine leaders actively try to secure 
imperial and political involvement in (and patronage of) these practices. According to Jinja 
Honchō 神社本庁 (Association of Shinto Shrines), the powerful umbrella organization with 
which most shrines in Japan are affiliated, prime-ministerial involvement in the shikinen 
sengū is desirable and in full accordance with tradition.3 In reality, however, Abe was the 
first postwar prime minister to take part in this ceremony, which is illustrative of significant 
changes in the public perception of the shikinen sengū in the postwar period and, by 
extension, shifting state-religion boundaries.4 
Contrary to ministerial visits to Yasukuni, Abe’s participation in the ceremony at Ise 
received little international media coverage and hardly any criticism, despite the fact that 
he went there in his capacity as the country’s leading politician. It is no secret that Abe 
maintains close links with the shrine establishment and some of its conservative-nationalist 
lobby groups, yet few of his critics have denounced his patronage of Ise. After all, this shrine 
has been so successfully depoliticized and turned into a core symbol of both traditional 
Japanese culture and the natural environment ( fūdo 風土) by which it is supposedly 
shaped, that only a handful of interpreters saw his ritual participation as a violation of 
the constitutional separation of religion and state. Ise transcends religious and political 
particularities, it appears, and functions as a depoliticized symbol of the sacred nation 
(shinkoku 神国) Japan. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that Abe has shied away from 
the heavily contested Yasukuni issue, and embraced Ise as an alternative carrying profound 
1 Mullins 2012. For a more elaborate discussion of the lobby groups behind these developments, see the article 
by Thierry Guthmann in this special issue. 
2 Breen 2010b.
3 Tanaka 2011, p. 25.
4 See Teeuwen and Breen 2017. On the different meanings of Ise, see also Rambelli 2014.
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symbolic capital, which has the capacity not only to unite Japanese people of different 
convictions but also to function internationally as a symbol of “ancient Japanese culture.” 5
Abe is not the only political actor who has discovered and appropriated the symbolic 
capital of the Ise Shrines. In June 2014, the Inner Shrine at Ise was visited by representatives 
of various “world religions”—including Buddhism, Islam, Daoism, and several Christian 
denominations—who attended a major international conference entitled “Tradition for the 
Future: Culture, Faith and Values for a Sustainable Planet,” where various issues related 
to religion and the environment were discussed.6 The conference was organized by Jinja 
Honchō, in cooperation with the Alliance of Religions and Conservation (ARC), a UK-
based nonprofit organization which defines itself as “a secular body that helps the major 
religions of the world to develop their own environmental programmes, based on their 
own core teachings, beliefs and practices.” 7 Among the conference speakers were Jinja 
Honchō’s current president Tanaka Tsunekiyo 田中恆清, a member of the Japanese imperial 
family, a Shingon Buddhist leader, and the Assistant Secretary-General of the United 
Nations Development Program. Although the event was not open to the general public, it 
was reportedly attended by approximately seven hundred Shinto priests from all over the 
country, as well as by a number of selected journalists and scholars.8 One of them, Paul 
Vallely, published a report in The Independent, describing the conference as part of the 
“remarkable resurgence of Japan’s ancient religion of Shintoism,” which “has produced a 
new Japanese openness to the wider world.” This openness was supposedly illustrated by the 
event’s interreligious character, as well as the apparent environmental awareness of the actors 
involved, which, he suggested, “could benefit the whole world.” 9
At first sight, this image seems to be at odds with the one of a nationalist religion of 
increasing political significance. How can the image of Shinto as an open, internationally 
oriented and environmentally-minded religion be reconciled with the image of a conservative 
tradition with close links to a government that antagonizes neighboring countries and has 
failed to implement meaningful environmental policies? Yet it is precisely this paradox that 
defines contemporary Shinto. As I have noted elsewhere, the notion of Shinto as a tradition 
of nature worship with a strong environmental orientation is actually compatible with 
conservative and neo-imperial ideology.10 For one, this “Shinto environmentalist paradigm,” 
as I call it, strengthens notions of the land of Japan as inherently sacred, and justifies the 
belief that Shinto is (or should be) essentially a public tradition, concerned with the this-
worldly well-being of the Japanese nation—and, by extension, the world as a whole.11 Thus, 
I argue in this article, it is through the discursive association of Shinto with “nature” that 
its public significance is currently asserted, and its position vis-à-vis both the state and the 
category “religion” renegotiated. Put differently, the hypothesis explored here is that the 
association of Shinto with nature and the environment is central to the deprivatization and 
 5 Hence Abe’s insistence that the 2016 G7 Summit should take place at Ise (see The Japan Times 2015). A 
similar argument was made by Michael Cucek, who convincingly argued that Abe has little interest in visiting 
Yasukuni precisely because patronage of Ise is less controversial and more politically beneficial (Cucek 2015).
 6 Kōshitsu henshūbu 2014. See also Rots 2015.
 7 ARC, n.d.
 8 Dougill 2014.
 9 Vallely 2014.
10 Rots 2015.
11 For more elaborate discussions of the “Shinto environmentalist paradigm,” see Rots 2013 and Rots 2015.
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discursive secularization by which it is currently characterized. Before elaborating on this 
issue, however, let us have a closer look at the terminology, and explore some of the ways in 
which Shinto relates to secularism and notions of “the secular.”
The Public Secular
In recent years, a number of scholars have drawn attention to the fact that “religion” and “the 
secular” are historically shaped categories, the meanings of which are neither pre-given nor 
fixed.12 From this, it follows that sociocultural phenomena are not intrinsically “religious” 
or “secular.” Rather, their categorization is a function of discourse, and the product of 
particular power relations, as Talal Asad has demonstrated.13 What counts as “secular” or 
as “religious” is not a natural given: it is the outcome of historical processes of classification 
and negotiation. The same, I argue, applies to Shinto: whether Shinto is classified as 
“religious” or “secular” continues to be subject to debate. Accordingly, in this article I will 
refrain from engaging with the question whether Shinto really is religious or secular, as that 
would imply these categories have some sort of fixed “intrinsic” meaning. Instead, I look at 
ways in which contemporary shrine practices are framed as “secular” and “public” by leading 
Shinto scholars. By doing so, I draw on the work of Talal Asad and his followers, who re-
historicized the categories “religion” and “the secular,” and examined processes by which the 
two have been constructed in particular historical and cultural contexts.14 In addition, I will 
make use of the theories of Charles Taylor, who conceived of the religion-secular dichotomy 
in terms of a distinction between transcendence and immanence. 
It should be pointed out that “the secular” is not the same as “secularism,” “secularity,” 
and “secularization.” While these terms are obviously related, they carry different meanings. 
Following José Casanova, we may conceive of “the secular” as “a central modern category— 
theological-philosophical, legal-political, and cultural-anthropological—to construct, 
codify, grasp, and experience a realm or reality differentiated from ‘the religious.’ … It 
should be obvious that ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’ are always and everywhere mutually 
constituted.” 15 By contrast, “secularism” refers to a range of ideologies or world views 
that stipulate the separation of religion from purportedly secular spheres (for example, 
politics and education) and seek to restrict the societal space allocated to religion. This is 
closely related to the public-private dichotomy, as Bubandt and van Beek rightly point out 
(in reference to Asad): “This analytic treats ‘secularism’ as a political doctrine or project 
that rearranges society through a new set of socio-spatial divisions: private and public, 
the religious and the secular. In assigning each to its ‘proper place’—‘religion’ to the 
private domain and ‘the secular’ to the public domain—secularism makes possible the 
establishment of a domain of secular politics that transcends that of religion.” 16 As I shall 
demonstrate in this article, the distinction between a “public” secular realm and a “private” 
religious realm is of profound relevance for contemporary Japanese society and ideology.
12 For example Smith 1998. Critical historical studies of the formation of the modern category “religion” in 
Japan include Isomae 2003; Josephson 2012; Maxey 2014. 
13 Asad 2003.
14 Asad 2003. See Bubandt and van Beek 2012 for an insightful discussion of the relevance of Asad’s theory for 
understanding contemporary Asian societies.
15 Casanova 2011, p. 54.
16 Bubandt and van Beek 2012, pp. 7–8.
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While “the secular” refers to a societal realm, and “secularism” to particular world 
views or ideologies, “secularization” refers to the processes by which (aspects of ) societies 
become more secular. As several scholars have pointed out, “secularization” is not a 
monolithic concept: it has been used to refer to a number of different processes, which may 
or may not coexist, and which may or may not be irreversible.17 Casanova has famously 
distinguished three types of secularization: “the decline of religious beliefs and practices” 
(which, he adds, “is the most recent but by now the most widespread usage of the term 
in contemporary academic debates on secularization”); “the privatization of religion”; 
and “the differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, science)” from religion.18 
Casanova’s conceptual triad was developed further by Charles Taylor, who distinguished 
between secularization as, first, “the retreat of religion in public life” (that is, privatization); 
second, “the decline in belief and practice”; and third, and central to his theory, “the 
change in the conditions of belief.” 19 Taylor’s model was applied by Richard Madsen in his 
analysis of processes of secularization in Asia, referring to them as, respectively, “political 
secularization,” “social secularization,” and “cultural secularization.” 20
Several scholars have pointed out that the categories “religious” and “secular” are co-
constitutive: they have emerged in tandem, and the differentiation of the former from 
other societal spheres could not have taken place without the formation of the latter. As 
described by Charles Taylor, both emerged within a late-medieval European ecclesiastic 
context (“Latin Christendom,” in his terminology).21 At the time, the term “secular” was 
used to refer to clergy and church institutions concerned with this-worldly affairs, whereas 
“religious” referred to world-renouncing monastic communities. As he writes, “the secular 
had to do with the ‘century’—that is, with profane time—and it was contrasted with what 
related to eternal, or to sacred time.… Ordinary parish priests are thus ‘secular’ because 
they operate out there in the ‘century’ as against those in monastic institutions.” 22 The 
defining feature of Western modernity, according to Taylor, was not so much the awareness 
of a distinction between “profane” (this-worldly) or “sacred” (transcendent) time and space, 
as the realization that the former could exist independently from the latter. As he writes,
what does seem … to exist universally is some distinction between higher beings 
(spirits) and realms and the everyday world we see immediately around us. But these 
are not usually sorted out into two distinct domains, such that the lower one can be 
taken as a system understandable purely in its own terms. Rather, the levels usually 
interpenetrate, and the lower cannot be understood without reference to the higher.… 
The clear separation of an immanent from a transcendent order is one of the inventions 
(for better or worse) of Latin Christendom.23
17 See for instance Berger 1999; Dobbelaere 1981; Casanova 1994; Demerath 2007. For an overview of recent 
academic literature on “secularization” and “secularities” in Japan, see the introduction to this special issue.
18 Casanova 2006, p. 7. Cf. Casanova 1994.
19 Taylor 2007, p. 423.
20 Madsen 2011.
21 Taylor 2007; 2011.
22 Taylor 2011, p. 32. Cf. Taylor 2007, pp. 54–61.
23 Taylor 2011, p. 33.
184
Aike P. Rots
I will not attempt to challenge Taylor’s claim that the development of an “immanent 
frame” freed from transcendent legitimation occurred first in Europe, as this is beyond the 
scope of the present article.24 Instead, my purpose here is to draw attention to the initial 
meanings of the (originally European) categories “secular” and “religious,” as outlined by 
Taylor, and reexamine these in a Japanese context. I believe these offer some important clues 
for understanding present-day attempts to “secularize” Shinto, which coexist with efforts 
at (re)sacralization, as I shall explain below. Importantly, as Taylor proposes, in medieval 
Europe the categories “secular” and “religion” were both concerned with gods, priests, and 
rituals. The difference lies in the fact that the former refers to the world here-and-now, 
and is contingent upon space and time, while the latter denotes other-worldly practices 
believed to transcend historical and cultural particularities. Thus, the foundational dyad of 
Western modernity, in Taylor’s scheme, is the immanent-transcendent dichotomy—hence 
the core analytical concept he uses to describe the secular condition, “the immanent frame.” 
Originally, therefore, “secularity” does not signify the absence of deities, offerings, or ritual 
specialists: quite the contrary, what it signifies is their immanent character.
“Secular,” in this sense of the term, does not necessarily mean “disenchanted,” nor does 
it imply institutional neutrality, atheism, or the absence of worship practices in public space, 
even though this is how the term is often understood today. What it implies is that the gods 
are manifest in our world and, as a consequence, are culturally and historically contingent. 
“Secularization,” according to this line of thought, refers to the development by which the 
world here-and-now comes to be seen as the sole foundation of social life, no longer in need 
of “transcendent” legitimation. This is the defining feature of our “secular age,” according 
to Taylor: the social order no longer needs an external frame of reference, as the world in 
which we live has come to be seen as the foundational principle (the “immanent frame”). 
Institutions, narratives, and practices concerned with transcendent matters still exist, but 
they are no longer foundational. Instead, participation and belief has become optional—a 
matter of choice, not a pre-given.
Thus, I suggest we reconsider the original meaning of “secular”—as immanent, 
public, and concerned with the common good of the world in which we live, not necessarily 
devoid of gods or rituals—as a conceptual tool for understanding present-day attempts at 
repositioning Shinto. One note of caution is needed, however. When using the concept 
“secular” in this way—that is, as a term that denotes the immanent character of certain 
practices and world views—we should recognize the fact that in most political and 
academic discourse it is no longer utilized as such. As explained above, in modern times 
the term has come to carry quite different meanings indeed, typically denoting societal 
fields that are differentiated from religion altogether, not those that are dependent on and 
legitimated by it. Nevertheless, I think it is worth reconsidering the meaning of “secular” 
prior to the early modern differentiation of “religion” and “politics,” as explained by Taylor: 
rituals, clergy and beliefs concerned with immanent reality, as opposed to monastic orders 
concerned with transcendent matters. I believe such an approach may shed some light 
on contemporary Shinto ideology, which is neither “atheistic” (kami 神 remain central to 
24 For instance, Christoph Kleine (2013) and Ian Reader (2004) both argued that there were functional 
equivalents to the religious-secular dichotomy in premodern Japan. See also the article by Kiri Paramore in 
this special issue.
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Shinto thought and practice) nor “anti-religious,” but concerned rather with reestablishing 
Shinto as a this-worldly ritual system placed in the center of public space both literally 
and metaphorically. Why is it that Shinto actors and institutions have such an ambivalent 
relation to the category “religion”? Might it be that Shinto is indeed perceived as a “secular” 
worship tradition—not because there are no gods, but because the gods are place-based and 
immanent? To what extent is the “discursive secularization” of Shinto that we are currently 
witnessing—I will return to this term later—grounded in its immanent character? These 
are the questions I explore in the next sections of this article.
Secular Shinto?
The notion of Shinto as a public non-religion, closely intertwined with the nation state and 
its divine imperial house, is often associated with conservative ideology. Yet it was one of 
the most critical historians who suggested that premodern Shinto might be perceived as the 
“secular” or this-worldly (sezokuteki 世俗的) counterpart of the transcendentally oriented 
Buddhist monastic institutions. In his famous article “Shinto in the History of Japanese 
Religion,” Kuroda Toshio 黒田俊雄 writes:
Here it is important to note the secular character of Shinto in medieval times. Many 
of the representations of kami familiar to people were secular in form.… The same can 
also be said of how the word suijaku 垂迹 (manifestation) was comprehended.… The 
term suijaku literally meant to descend from heaven to a given spot and to become the 
local or guardian kami of that spot.25
Kuroda proceeds to argue that the “secular representations in Shinto actually expressed an 
essence that was strongly Buddhist,” that “shrines were Buddhism’s secular face,” and that 
Shinto’s “secularity functioned, in the final analysis, within a Buddhist world.” 26 Thus, in 
the medieval shinbutsu shūgō 神仏習合 system, shrines, shrine priests, and kami were this-
worldly manifestations or representations of Buddhist monastic institutions, monks, and 
Buddhas and bodhisattvas. As such, Kuroda argues, they were more closely intertwined 
with public administration and politics than their Buddhist counterparts.27 
It has been a while since Kuroda conducted his paradigm-changing research, and 
some of his conclusions have since been challenged.28 However, there are some interesting 
similarities between his description of the labor division between Shinto shrines and 
Buddhist monastic institutions in medieval Japan, and Taylor’s description of the role of 
“secular” versus “religious” clergy in Latin Christian Europe. The division of labor between 
“Buddhist” institutions and deities on the one hand, and “Shinto” ones on the other, was 
arguably more complicated than Kuroda suggested: Buddhist monastic centers were not 
solely concerned with transcendent matters, and the distinction between kami and Buddhas 
was not always as clear-cut as it appears in this model. Yet Kuroda’s basic point, that there 
was a division between a “this-worldly” and a “transcendent” realm in medieval Japan, has 
25 Kuroda 1981, p. 14.
26 Kuroda 1981, p. 15.
27 Kuroda 1981, pp. 15–16.
28 For a discussion, see Teeuwen and Scheid 2002.
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been substantiated by others, even if they did not equate these realms with “Shinto” and 
“Buddhism.” 29
Assuming that premodern Japan indeed had some sort of distinction between an 
immanent and a transcendent order, Taylor’s argument that the separation of the former 
from the latter was one of modernity’s foundational moments may be applicable to Japan 
as well. The “separation of Shinto and Buddhism” (shinbutsu bunri 神仏分離) in the early 
Meiji period may then have given rise to some sort of Taylorian immanent frame: the 
gods were made manifest and of immediate public concern, while belief in a transcendent 
order became a matter of personal choice, one option among others. Thus, Taylor’s own 
arguments concerning the uniquely Western character of secularization notwithstanding, 
the Meiji period configuration of “religion” (shūkyō 宗教) as private and faith-based, and 
Shinto as a public nonreligious ritual system (hishūkyō 非宗教), was profoundly Taylorian: 
it has some clear parallels with developments in early modern Europe, where the immanent 
order gradually replaced the transcendent order as the primary frame of reference.30 In other 
words, the fact that medieval (proto) Shinto was “secular” (that is, this-worldly) did not 
make it any less “religious” in the modern sense of the word. However, when it was reshaped 
and reclassified in the modern period, its immanent character facilitated its formation as a 
nonreligious entity. Hence, as Kuroda states,
The secularity of Shinto and the political applicability of the concept of “the land of 
the kami” does not indicate that Shinto was without any religious character but rather 
shows that the Buddhist system that lay behind it pervaded all aspects of everyday 
life. The present-day illusion that Shinto is not a religion derives historically from a 
misunderstanding of this point.31
Several scholars have discussed the process whereby Shrine Shinto came to be understood 
as “nonreligious.” 32 Most recently, Jason Josephson has addressed this issue in his study of 
the formation of the category “religion” in Japan.33 Josephson writes that “religion” entered 
Japan as “a nonnative category that emerged in a diplomatic context, such that its contours 
were established by asymmetries of power and centered on Christianity as its prototype.” 34 
Shinto, meanwhile, “was the condition for the eventual invention of religion in Japan, 
because it was the form of the political from which religion could be distinguished.” 35 
Reflecting Kuroda’s account of Shinto’s this-worldly character, Josephson asserts that Shinto 
was closely intertwined with education and politics, constituting the basic entity from 
which the modern category “religion” was differentiated. Thus, he refers to the Meiji-period 
construction of “Shinto”—the public, de-Buddhistified, mandatory ritual-ideological system 
conventionally known as “State Shinto”—by the term “Shinto secular.” Josephson defines 
29 For example Satō 2003; Kleine 2013; Teeuwen 2013.
30 On the formation of the category “religion” in Meiji-period Japan, see Josephson 2012; Maxey 2014. See also 
the articles by Hans Martin Krämer and Mark Teeuwen in this special issue.
31 Kuroda 1981, p. 16.
32 Hardacre 1989; Isomae 2003; Nitta 2000.
33 Josephson 2012.
34 Josephson 2012, p. 132.
35 Josephson 2012, p. 132.
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“Shinto secular” as “the hybrid Shinto-scientific ideology that undergirded the Meiji state 
and was ultimately distinguished from the category religion.” 36 In contrast to the classical 
view of “State Shinto” as a state religion in disguise, Josephson argues that Shinto could 
become a public, imperial worship system exactly by virtue of it being “secularized.” That 
is, it was coercively “purified” from popular devotional practices, discursively associated 
with science and modernity, and legally distinguished from “religion,” which had been 
configured as “private” and, hence, optional. As he writes,
Shinto functioned as the secular in two ways. First, Shinto produced a political reality 
from which religion could be distinguished. It was a precondition for the formation 
of religion as a legal category in the 1889 Japanese Constitution. Second, after the 
production of the category “religion,” the Shinto secular became a politics that could 
be distinguished from “religion.” Once a Japanese subject granted this Shinto secular 
ground, religion (Buddhism and Sect Shinto, but also Christianity) was a matter of 
free choice and therefore optional. This echoed what Charles Taylor described as the 
core of secularism in the West as the situation in which religion “is understood to be 
one option among others.” 37
For clarity’s sake: the creation of a “secular” Shinto did not entail the removal of divine 
beings, ritual practices, and sacred symbols from the public sphere. After all, as Josephson 
describes it, the notion that Japan was “a holy nation beloved by the gods” was taught 
in public education and was quickly naturalized.38 Moreover, the “unity of ritual and 
government” (saisei itchi 祭政一致) became an important political principle, and shrine 
worship was effectively integrated into the ideological state apparatus, especially from the 
late Meiji and Taishō periods onwards. However, if one understands “the secular” as “the 
immanent frame” from which “religion” is differentiated, as I have suggested, Josephson’s 
choice of the term “Shinto secular” arguably makes sense. Moreover, he is right to point 
out that this new ritual-ideological system was closely intertwined with the project of 
modernization, and associated with the new positivistic episteme, rather than constituting 
some sort of lingering premodern relic. In any case, the category distinction that emerged 
at the time—a “public,” deprivatized, and mandatory national Shinto that was perceived 
and classified as essentially different from “private” religious institutions, membership of 
which became a matter of individual choice—continues to be relevant today, as it underlies 
popular contemporary notions of Shinto as “traditional culture” concerned with community 
life and the common good, centered around the local shrine and its sacred grove. I will 
discuss these notions in more detail shortly.
In sum, it would appear that, in Taylorian terms, Shinto—the “secular” counterpart of 
Buddhism in the medieval period—came to constitute the “immanent frame” upon which 
Japanese modernity was founded. “Religions” such as Buddhism were privatized, losing 
36 Josephson 2012, p. 132. For a critical assessment of Josephson’s association of Shinto with “science,” see the 
article by Mark Teeuwen in this special issue. In the present article, I refrain from discussing Josephson’s 
interpretation of the category “science.” Instead, I engage with his notion of Shinto as a public, “secular” 
worship system, which I find very useful.
37 Josephson 2012, p. 138; citing C. Taylor 2007, p. 3.
38 Josephson 2012, p. 156.
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their previous self-evident and privileged position, and religious belief and affiliation became 
a matter of personal choice. Shinto, on the other hand, became the foundation on which 
modern Japanese secularism was based, notwithstanding the importance of divine beings 
and rituals. No wonder contemporary Shinto scholars and priests are eager to reintroduce 
Meiji-period symbolism into the public realm, challenge the postwar privatization of 
shrines, and assert Shinto’s essentially public character. Drawing on Meiji-period notions of 
Shinto as shūkyō’s secular Other, leading Shinto actors today are actively promoting not only 
the deprivatization but also the discursive secularization of their tradition. 
Sacralization and Discursive Secularization in Japan
Some interpreters have perceived the return of Shinto symbols and rituals in the public 
realm as evidence that Japan is not truly secular, and that Japanese politics and society 
are going through a period of de-secularization, characterized by a “return of religion” in 
politics.39 Legally and politically speaking, this indeed appears to be the case: as illustrated 
by Abe’s appropriation of Ise, the separation of state and religion (or at least the separation 
of state and Shinto) is increasingly challenged by leading political actors. Meanwhile, the 
nation state and emperor are subject to new attempts at sacralization.40 However, seen in 
Taylorian terms, what we are perhaps witnessing is not so much the return of religion per 
se—indeed, generally speaking, institutionalized religion in Japan is in a state of decline, 
some exceptions notwithstanding—but, rather, attempts to reestablish Shinto as the 
foundational and sacred (that is, divinely ordained and non-negotiable) framework upon 
which twenty-first century Japanese society will be built.41 Sacralization thus goes hand in 
hand with what I call the discursive secularization of Shinto: the reconstruction of Shinto as 
the natural, immanent, and commonly shared world view of Japan, supposedly grounded in 
and shaped by the country’s physical environment. In this Taylorian scheme, Shinto is not 
so much areligious as some sort of ontological a priori that shapes the conditions of religious 
(or nonreligious) beliefs.
As John Nelson has made clear in a recent article, secularization is culturally 
specific. It is contingent upon time and place, not a universally valid historical necessity. 
It is a multi-faceted phenomenon: multiple processes of secularization can be at work 
simultaneously, which are “globally diffuse” and “locally determined.” 42 These processes 
are influenced by global as well as national and local developments in law, mass media, 
and public discourse.43 Nelson’s approach makes clear that secular ideologies and multiple 
processes of secularization (locally grounded and not necessarily irreversible) are, indeed, 
inf luential aspects of contemporary Japanese society and politics. That does not mean, 
however, that religion in Japan is dying out. As sociologist of religion N. J. Demerath has 
pointed out, processes of secularization often give way to processes of sacralization. That 
is, “modernization does often lead to forms of secularization, but these in turn often spark 
a sacralizing response—one that ironically uses the means of modernity to protest the 
39 See for instance Guthmann’s article in this special issue.
40 Mullins 2012. 
41 On institutional decline, see Reader 2012; cf. Covell 2005.
42 Nelson 2012, p. 37.
43 On the impact of globalization on local secularization practices, see Dessì 2013.
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ends of modernity.” 44 The term “sacralization” refers to “the process by which the secular 
becomes sacred or other new forms of the sacred emerge, whether in matters of personal 
faith, institutional practice or political power.” 45 In other words, it refers to the production 
and reproduction of “the sacred” in public.46 Note that this term does not equal the notion 
of “de-secularization” as used by sociologist Peter Berger, for sacralization does not negate 
secularization.47 Rather, according to this argument, they are two sides of the same coin, 
sacralization constituting a profoundly “modern” response to secularization. Indeed, 
secular elements can be sacralized (for example, national flags and civic commemoration 
ceremonies), just as religious elements can lose their sacred character.
Mark Mullins’ article on sacralization in contemporary Japan follows Demerath’s 
theoretical model.48 He points out that secularization in Japan is by no means an 
unambiguous process, as “there are ‘multiple secularities’ competing in Japan today.” 49 As 
the title of his article suggests, they paradoxically coexist with processes of deprivatization 
and “the reappearance of ‘public religion’ in Japanese society.” Mullins argues that recent 
decades have seen the gradual “de-privatization of religion” in Japan, especially Shinto: 
several players have consistently lobbied for the revitalization of Shinto as a national ritual 
tradition, to be reassigned important public ceremonial and ideological functions. In 
particular, Mullins outlines the efforts of the Shintō Seiji Renmei 神道政治連盟—a political 
lobby organization associated with Jinja Honchō—to reestablish imperial symbolism in the 
public sphere, nationalize Yasukuni Shrine, revise the constitution, and rewrite national 
history.50
We can refer to this development as the return of sacred symbols and rituals to the 
public sphere; or, alternatively, as the (re)sacralization of the public sphere. That is, instead of 
the deprivatization of religious institutions in general, we are witnessing the deprivatization 
of some rituals, symbols, and worship places, which are reframed as public and national 
rather than private and “religious.” In other words, the declining popularity of the category 
“shūkyō” in Japan does not equal the decline of religious institutions per se, only their 
transformation and reclassification. Secularization coexists with, and may even give rise to, 
processes of sacralization and the corresponding reappearance of “sacred” symbols in politics 
and public space. A well-known example of this is the ongoing patronage of Yasukuni 
Shrine by prominent politicians, which continues to jeopardize Japan’s foreign relations. At 
least as important is the return of Ise as a core symbol of the nation and its primordial ties 
to the land of Japan and the imperial family, as discussed in the introduction. Central to 
this was the impressive (yet uncritical) media coverage of the 2013 shikinen sengū, which was 
44 Demerath 2007, p. 68.
45 Demerath 2007, p. 66.
46 I use the term “sacred” to refer to objects, places, and practices that are perceived as nonnegotiable; that are 
set apart from the ordinary, physically as well as discursively; and that are believed to possess certain eternal 
qualities, that is, that are believed to transcend historical particularities (cf. Rots 2013, pp. 78–87). For a 
more elaborate discussion of “the sacred” as an analytical category, see Anttonen 2000.
47 Berger 1999.
48 Mullins 2012.
49 Mullins 2012, p. 79. On the concept of “multiple secularities,” see also Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012.
50 Mullins 2012, pp. 71–80; cf. Breen 2010a. On this topic, see also the article by Thierry Guthmann in this 
special issue.
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generally framed as a great cultural event of nationwide significance rather than a religious 
happening.
Thus, various attempts are made to challenge the constitutional separation of state and 
religion, and to reassert the position of Shinto-related symbols and practices in the public 
sphere. While some sites and practices are subject to heated debate (for example, worship at 
Yasukuni by the prime minister), others are much less politicized, at least in public discourse 
(for example, his patronage of the Ise shrines). Significantly, in both these cases, most of the 
actors involved evade the category of religion altogether, instead framing Shinto practices 
and places as “traditional culture” and “heritage,” conceiving of them as essentially public. 
It is to this reframing that I refer with the term “discursive secularization.”
As mentioned previously, Charles Taylor distinguished between three types of 
secularization: political, social, and cultural.51 Although Taylor’s analysis is concerned with 
“the West,” as we have seen, these categories can be applied to Asia as well, as Richard 
Madsen has demonstrated in an insightful comparative article.52 In addition, however, I 
suggest we distinguish a fourth type: discursive secularization. I use this term to refer to 
processes by which beliefs, practices, and institutions previously classified as “religion” 
are redefined and reconfigured (by many of the leading actors involved) as “culture,” 
“tradition,” “heritage,” “science,” or even “nature”; in sum, as non-religion. This may go 
hand in hand with processes of deprivatization, sacralization, and/or attempts to reclaim 
the public sphere, as in the case of contemporary Shinto, but this is not necessarily the case. 
Importantly, however, discursive secularization does not necessarily imply the decline of 
faith in supernatural beings, ritual activities, or places of worship. What it means is that 
they acquire new meanings in a changing context, as they are dissociated from the master 
category “religion,” which in Japan has come to be contaminated to the point that few 
people or institutions are willing to identify with it.53
The notion of discursive secularization is an important contribution to existing theories 
of secularization, I argue, as it allows for the fact that “emic” conceptualizations do not 
necessarily reflect wider societal processes. Importantly, the fact that certain religious actors 
decide to redefine themselves in explicitly “nonreligious” terms does not automatically 
imply institutional privatization or decline, nor does it mean they are no longer classified 
as “religious” in law, politics, academia, or media representations. We should distinguish 
between self-definitions and other types of classification, as these do not always correspond. 
Furthermore, the notion of discursive secularization is useful for distinguishing between 
practices and interpretations: people may engage in practices that are legally and academically 
classified as religious, yet conceptualize these in different terms, which may be explicitly 
nonreligious. This does not mean they are inconsistent or self-contradictory: all it shows is 
that the category “religion” may be employed or discarded for various reasons, that practices 
are neither intrinsically “religious” nor intrinsically “secular,” and that a practice described 
as “religious” by some may be perceived in different terms by others. As we have seen, in a 
“secular age,” religious belief and practice have become optional; what is more, defining one’s 
51 Taylor 2007, pp. 2–3. For an explanation of Taylor’s categorization, see above.
52 Madsen 2011.
53 See Baffelli and Reader 2012.
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belief and practice as “religious” or not has become optional as well, in the sense that the 
label may be used or rejected, depending on (identity) politics and economic incentives.54
Thus, importantly, discursive secularization may be a strategy for survival employed 
by religious actors. Simply put, reframing shrine or temple worship as “traditional culture” 
(dentō bunka 伝統文化) instead of “religion” can be a means to attract more visitors. 
Significantly, in the Japanese secularist legal system, it is also a strategy to attract corporate 
and state sponsors. Not surprisingly, then, many prominent religious institutions (shūkyō 
hōjin 宗教法人) these days have set up nonprofit organizations (NPO hōjin NPO 法人) 
for the promotion of shrine and temple activities, including cultural events, tree-planting, 
educational activities, and workshops in “traditional arts.” Such activities serve to establish 
stronger bonds between these institutions and nearby communities, create positive publicity 
and, perhaps most importantly, raise funds for maintaining buildings, groves, and so on. 
Creating a puppet nonprofit organization is a means for religious institutions to secure 
financial support from local authorities and corporate sponsors; in addition, it can be a 
strategy for engaging in educational activities that would otherwise be unlawful, providing 
“religious socialization in disguise.” 55
In sum, my argument here is that leading contemporary Shinto actors actively seek 
to reframe their tradition as “traditional Japanese culture” rather than religion, even if 
some of them do not deny Shinto’s religious character when asked directly. Thus, they 
are contributing to the discursive secularization of their tradition. As such, they are not 
unique: similar patterns have been observed in Buddhist pilgrimage, for instance, where 
heritagization reportedly led to a decline in devotional practices, and in some “new 
religions” reinventing themselves in terms of science, therapy, education, or development.56 
Contrary to Reader’s rather gloomy prediction of religion in Japan “dying,” however, I do 
not see this discursive secularization as evidence of religious decline per se: on the contrary, 
it can be a powerful strategy for institutional adaptation.
Nor, for that matter, do I see it necessarily as evidence of a decline in devotional 
practices. The shrines of Kumano are a case in point. They are UNESCO World Heritage 
listed, and widely perceived as an important cultural site; they nonetheless receive ample 
attention in the Japanese media as mythological sacred sites (seichi 聖地), characterized by 
primordial natural beauty and filled with spiritual “powerspots.” 57 Discursive secularization 
and heritagization thus do not necessarily mean that places lose their perceived “sacred” or 
“spiritual” character, but that they are conceived in terms of culture, tradition, and nature, 
rather than “religion.” “Religion,” after all, means “private”—and if there is one thing the 
sacred forests and shrines of places such as Kumano and Ise are not, according to the Shinto 
54 There is some overlap with the notion of “internal secularization,” used by Isaac Gagné (in this issue), 
drawing on the work of Dobbelaere (1981) and others. The difference is that “discursive secularization” not 
only refers to internal institutional dynamics, but also to ways in which religious actors (either institutional 
or individual) present themselves to the outside world; that is, how they frame their own beliefs and practices. 
Discursive secularization does not necessarily imply a change in those beliefs and practices; rather, it means 
that they are conceptualized and classified differently.
55 Rots 2013, p. 336.
56 On the decline in devotional practices at Buddhist temples, see Reader 2012. On discursive secularization 
among new religions, see for instance Watanabe 2015. See also the articles by Erica Baffelli and Isaac Gagné 
in this special issue.
57 For a discussion of the impact of Kumano being listed as a UNESCO World Heritage site, see McGuire 2013. 
192
Aike P. Rots
establishment and its academic spokesmen, it 
is “private.” That is, in contemporary Shinto 
ideology, it is often argued that, in order for 
Japanese society to function well, shrines 
need to be reassigned their “proper” place not 
as private religious institutions, but as public 
community centers, the function of which is 
social and political as well as spiritual. Central 
to this ideology is the notion of chinju no mori 
鎮守の森・鎮守の杜. Literally, this term refers 
to the “sacred grove” or area of woodland 
surrounding a shrine, but it has recently come 
to symbolize the shrine as a whole, and its 
connection to a local community (ujiko 氏子) 
—as well as, by extension, Shinto’s essentially 
public character. It is to this notion of chinju 
no mori that I will now turn.
Chinju no mori: Public Shrine Forests?
As I have outlined elsewhere, in recent decades, 
a new Shinto paradigm has emerged.58 I 
refer to this as the “Shinto environmentalist 
paradigm”: the notion that Shinto is a primordial tradition of nature worship (sometimes 
referred to as “animistic”), which contains ancient ecological knowledge on how to live in 
harmonious coexistence with nature. Proponents of this paradigm not only draw attention 
to the intimate connection between shrines, Shinto world views and practices, and (local) 
natural environments; they also often assert that this ancient ecological knowledge—which, 
they argue, has been forgotten by most Japanese people as a result of the twin processes of 
modernization and “Westernization”—contains important clues for living sustainably and 
solving environmental problems today. Their ideas have gradually spread in recent decades, 
to the point that they have come to exercise significant impact on mainstream Shinto self-
definitions and practices, including, as we shall see, those of the generally conservative 
umbrella organization Jinja Honchō. 
Central to the Shinto environmentalist paradigm is the notion of chinju no mori. 
Composed of the terms chinju 鎮守 (or chinjugami 鎮守神, a protective local diety) and 
mori 森・杜 (forest), the modern compound word chinju no mori has come to signify the 
groves often surrounding Shinto shrines.59 In early postwar Japan, many of these centuries-
old shrine groves gave way to buildings and roads. In response, around 1980 a conservation 
movement emerged, led by scientists Ueda Atsushi 上田篤 and Miyawaki Akira 宮脇昭, who 
conducted research on the composition of shrine forests and pleaded for their preservation. 
In the 1990s, well-known historians of religion and shrine priests Ueda Masaaki 上田正昭 
and Sonoda Minoru 薗田稔 joined forces with these and other scientists in order to prevent 
58 Rots 2013; 2015.
59 See Rots 2015 for a discussion of this term and its etymology.
Figure 1. A typical broad-leaved chinju no mori. 
Tokiwa Jinja, Mito, Ibaraki Prefecture. Photo by the 
author.
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the further destruction of chinju no mori. In 2002, they established Shasō Gakkai 社叢学会 
(Sacred Forest Research Association), a scientific nonprofit organization focused on the 
dissemination of knowledge on shrine forest history and conservation.60 
Thanks to these initiatives, shrine forest preservation has become an issue of 
nationwide concern, and local non-profit organizations bringing together volunteers 
active in tree-planting, forest maintenance, and various educational activities have been 
set up throughout the country.61 Accordingly, the notion of chinju no mori has come to 
be used widely, but it no longer solely refers to the physical forests (or areas of woodland) 
surrounding shrines. As it is now regularly employed in various Shinto texts (for example, 
the weekly shrine newspaper Jinja Shinpō 神社新報 as well as other Jinja Honchō 
publications), the term has acquired symbolic significance extending far beyond forest 
ecology. Representing continuity (spiritual, ecological, and cultural) between the present 
and the imagined ancestral past, the shrine grove has come to be seen as the number one 
focal point of a local community: both physical, as a meeting place and sociocultural center, 
and symbolic, signifying social cohesion and existential belonging to a place. As such, the 
concept has acquired significant ideological potential. Not surprisingly, therefore, chinju no 
mori now feature prominently in contemporary Shinto texts that try to renegotiate postwar 
secularism and argue for the ongoing importance of shrines—not as private religious 
institutions, but as community focal points, located both literally and metaphorically in the 
center of public space. Two authors who have developed and appropriated the concept are 
Shinto scholar Sonoda Minoru and incumbent Jinja Honchō president Tanaka Tsunekiyo.
Sonoda Minoru is a scholar of religion and head priest of Chichibu Shrine in Saitama 
Prefecture. He is also one of the most prominent voices in the chinju no mori movement. 
For many years, Sonoda has been a leading member of Shasō Gakkai, as well as of the 
International Shinto Foundation (a nonprofit organization devoted to the dissemination of 
knowledge on Shinto, which has promoted the Shinto environmentalist paradigm both in 
Japan and abroad). He has described Shinto variously as a “natural religion” that was “formed 
spontaneously”; as the “ethnic religion” (minzoku shūkyō 民族宗教) of the Japanese people, 
which took shape in tandem with the ancient state; as a “communal religion” (kyōdōtai 
shūkyō 共同体宗教) that emerged in response to the natural landscape and climate (shizen 
fūdo 自然風土) of ancient Japan and constitutes a foundational aspect of Japanese culture; 
and as an ancient “forest religion” typical of primordial nature worship, unique as “the only 
ancient religion in the world that has survived until today.” 62 Thus, in Sonoda’s narrative, 
shrine worship is fundamentally interconnected with the physical landscape and climate of 
Japan (its fūdo) and its local village communities (kyōdōtai 共同体 or kakyō 家郷).63 As such, 
it is similar to other “primal religions” or “folk religions” worldwide, but it is the only such 
religion which has survived and even flourished in a modern society, while still retaining 
“strong characteristics of prehistoric religion.” 64
60 See for instance Ueda 2004. For a more elaborate discussion of the activities of Shasō Gakkai, see Rots 2013, 
pp. 287–93.
61 For examples, see Rots 2013, pp. 274–365.
62 Respectively Sonoda 1987, p. 3; Sonoda 1998, p. 149; Sonoda 1998, pp. 167–68; Sonoda 1998, p. 41.
63 Cf. Watsuji 1979.
64 Sonoda 1997, p. 45.
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As the above list makes clear, Sonoda does not deny Shinto the predicate “religion.” 
Quite the contrary: as a scholar of comparative religion well familiar with classical 
European theories in the field, he apparently adheres to a universalistic understanding of 
religion, seeing religion as a natural category present anywhere in the world since prehistoric 
times. He does, however, classify different types of religions, following classical theories 
that predate the “critical turn” in religious studies. According to Sonoda, there is a crucial 
distinction between “religions of the individual” (kojin shūkyō 個人宗教) and “communal 
religions.” The former are faith-based and individualistic; they have strongly influenced the 
perception of “religion” in modern times, including, significantly, the way in which religion 
is defined in the Constitution and other modern laws.65 Shinto, by contrast, is an integral 
part of Japan’s “religious culture” (shūkyō bunka 宗教文化), which was formed in a symbiotic 
relationship with the physical environment, while also shaping local community culture.66 
Thus, in the religious-cultural system described by Sonoda, local belonging and 
collective ritual practices take precedence over individual beliefs. The Japanese constitutional 
separation of state and religion, by contrast, rests on a “Western” understanding of religion, 
which does not adequately reflect the original Japanese situation in which religious practices 
were closely intertwined with local societies and their environments. To Sonoda, there is a 
fundamental distinction between “Western,” “monotheistic” religions such as Christianity 
on the one hand, and “ethnic” community religions such as Shinto on the other, not only 
with regard to the extent to which they are individualistic or collectivistic but also in their 
relationship to nature. His work echoes the rhetoric of contemporary nihonjinron 日本人論 
scholars such as Yasuda Yoshinori 安田喜憲 and Umehara Takeshi 梅原猛, both of whom 
have argued that Japan constitutes a “forest civilization,” whose animistic principles should 
serve as a model for overcoming the global environmental degradation caused by “Western 
monotheism.” 67 Thus, Sonoda argues that:
Western people raised in the Christian world view did not consider natural landscapes 
and forests as sacred. Instead, they cleared the land, built churches, and made artificial 
gardens, establishing order upon the world, the main point of which was to show 
God’s glory. By contrast, since ancient times in Japan deep mountain valleys, forests, 
waterfalls, rocks, and other such natural features, and even forests planted by people, 
were seen as sacred places guarded by gods and spirits.68
The accuracy of this statement may be debated, not only because it gives an arguably one-
sided representation of Christian notions of sacred space, but also because it overlooks 
the long Japanese history of cultivating and controlling nature. It is typical of the Shinto 
environmentalist paradigm, however, in its assertion that in ancient Shinto natural elements 
65 Sonoda 1998, p. 167.
66 Sonoda 1998, p. 168. Cf. Sonoda 2000.
67 For example Umehara 1995; Yasuda 2006. Umehara and Yasuda both appropriated Lynn White’s argument 
that the Christian world view is to blame for environmental exploitation, which they combined with 
a nationalist narrative of an “ecological golden age” followed by decline as a result of negative foreign 
influences. See White 1967.
68 Sonoda 1998, p. 31.
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were seen as intrinsically sacred, and that, consequently, Japanese people have preserved 
nature since ancient times.
As it is connected to and contingent upon local communities and their natural 
surroundings, Sonoda argues, Shrine Shinto transcends individual beliefs and political or 
ideological positions in its concern with the common good, that is, the community as a whole. 
Thus, he states, it transcends the anthropocentrism (ningenchūshinshugi 人間中心主義) 
characteristic of modernity, acknowledging the interdependence of human and nonhuman 
actors (gods, trees, animals, climatological phenomena, and so on).69 Concerned as it is with 
this-wordly collective well-being and sustainable human-nature relations—instead of, say, 
individual salvation in the afterlife—Shinto has an intrinsically public character (that is, 
“secular” in the sense of “this-worldly” and “immanent”). In Sonoda’s model, this public 
character is best represented by chinju no mori, which constitute the original shape of shrines 
(that is, people worshipped kami at sacred groves long before they started constructing 
shrine buildings). They are also seen as the focal points of matsuri (shrine festivals), the 
most important communitarian activities in traditional Japanese culture, socially as well 
as culturally. Through matsuri, social bonds between members of a local community are 
established and strengthened; moreover, by conducting the same rituals as their ancestors, 
people establish continuity between the present and the past. Chinju no mori constitute the 
centers of these local matsuri—and, hence, of the community as a whole.70 
Sacred Grove, Public Shrine
As suggested above, the importance of chinju no mori conservation far transcends ecological 
concerns. Arguably, for many of the actors involved, community building and the 
preservation (or revitalization) of cultural traditions are at least as important. Considering 
the discursive association between shrine forests, matsuri, and community life—none 
of which are commonly classified in terms of shūkyō, but which all contain devotional 
aspects nonetheless, possibly more so in the post-3/11 period than before—it comes as no 
surprise that Shinto actors assert shrines’ public significance (social, cultural, moral, and 
environmental), and reclaim their position in the public sphere.71 Thus, Shinto actors’ 
attempts to negotiate the secular constitution, and redefine the legal status of Shinto shrines, 
are not limited to controversial issues such as the nationalization of Yasukuni Shrine or the 
political position of the emperor; they are equally concerned with lesser-known issues such 
as state support for local shrines and festivals, the role of priests in public education, and the 
publicly funded preservation of shrine forest land and shrine buildings.
Contrary to what authors such as Sonoda suggest, however, these issues are contested as 
well. Not all Japanese subscribe to the notion that Shinto constitutes a foundational aspect 
of their national culture, even if they attend the occasional matsuri or visit a shrine on New 
Year’s Day (hatsumōde 初詣). Nor, for that matter, does everybody agree that shrines should 
be publicly funded. Constitutional changes that would lead to a revision of the secularist 
state apparatus, allowing for more direct government patronage of Shinto institutions, are 
69 Sonoda 1998, p. 151.
70 Sonoda 1998, pp. 91–138.
71 Elisabetta Porcu has argued that after the disasters of March 2011, people became more aware of the spiritual 
aspects of matsuri, which thus regained their devotional character to a certain degree (Porcu 2012, pp. 102–
103). This does not mean people conceived of these matsuri in terms of “religion,” however.
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highly controversial. And while 
a majority of the population 
may be fairly indifferent towards 
these issues, neither embracing 
Shinto as an important part 
of their identity nor rejecting 
it, some ideological minorities 
actively oppose such attempts 
at deprivatizing Shinto. These 
include leftist groups as well as 
Christians and members of reli-
gious movements such as Sōka 
Gakkai 創価学会, all of which 
are against state involvement 
in religious affairs, fearing the 
reestablishment of a type of 
“State Shinto” reminiscent of 
the period prior to 1945 when 
communists, Christian leaders, 
and members of several new religions were actively persecuted.
For instance, in 2010 there was the case of two shrines in the town of Sunagawa in 
Hokkaido, which had been given municipal land by the local authorities. This was an act 
of public support that was challenged by a number of local Protestants, who argued that 
it constituted a violation of the constitutional separation of religion and state. After all, 
according to the Constitution, “no religious organization shall receive any privileges from 
the State” (Article 20), and no public funds may be used “for the use, benefit or maintenance 
of any religious institution or association” (Article 89). The issue was taken up by the 
Supreme Court, which ruled that the local authorities had indeed violated the Constitution 
in the case of one of the two shrines (but not the other). According to the judge, shrine 
activities are not secular, but religious; the construction of a shrine on municipal (that 
is, public) land, therefore, is unlawful. This court ruling may have significant impact, as 
Sunagawa is by no means unique: throughout the country, there are shrines built on state-
owned land. Not surprisingly, then, the case received considerable media attention—and 
provoked the wrath of Shinto leaders and other conservatives.72
One example of a Shinto leader who has disputed the ruling of the Supreme Court 
is Tanaka Tsunekiyo, head priest of Iwashimizu Hachimangū Shrine in Yawata (Kyoto 
Prefecture) and current president of Jinja Honchō (since 2010). Tanaka questions the judges’ 
ruling that building a shrine on public land is unconstitutional, arguing that constitutional 
guarantees concerning the freedom of belief (shinkyō no jiyū 信教の自由) and the separation 
of state and religion (seikyō bunri 政教分離) should not undermine Japanese society. 
According to him, throughout Japanese history people have come together at shrines; 
meeting at a shrine ( jinja ni tsudou koto 神社に集うこと) even constitutes the “foundation of 
society” (shakai no konpon 社会の根本), as it is here that communities took shape in ancient 
72 Breen 2010a, pp. 68–71. See also the article by Ernils Larsson in this special issue.
Figure 2. Associated with the mythical first emperor Jinmu, Kashihara 
Jingū in Nara Prefecture is closely intertwined with modern imperial 
Shinto. It is a lso famous for its forest, however, showing that 
nationalism and nature conservation are not necessarily at odds. Photo 
by the author.
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times. Therefore, “this debate completely disregards the historical reality of the actual lives 
of the people, causing nothing but unnecessary confusion.” Shrines are a “natural” part of 
Japanese community life, according to Tanaka, and shrine worship is “in the DNA of the 
Japanese people.” 73
If shrines have an intrinsically public character, as Tanaka argues (thus formulating 
the ideological position of Jinja Honchō), it follows that the use of public land for shrines— 
or, by extension, the use of public funds for the maintenance of shrine buildings or the 
organization of shrine festivals—is only “natural.” Restricting the access of Shinto shrines 
to public land or funding, on the other hand, is at odds with Japanese tradition and “causes 
unnecessary confusion.” The role of Shinto priests, according to Tanaka, is fundamentally 
different from priests in other religions; while the latter are seen as preachers who mediate 
between this world and the divine, Shinto priests merely conduct rituals for the benefit of the 
community. Thus,
When seen from our perspective as shrine priests, shrine ritual worship and governance 
( jinja no “matsurigoto” 神社の「まつりごと」) is always “public.” 74 Private affairs do not 
take place at all. Put simply, all we do is pray for the peace and safety of the nation 
and the community (kyōdōtai) where we live. These are, so to speak, public prayers 
(paburikku na inori パブリックな祈り).75
Of course, the claim that shrine practices are intrinsically public is problematic, for 
various reasons. Not only is there a wide diversity of ritual and devotional practices taking 
place at shrines; shrines also earn most of their money by performing rituals on behalf of 
private companies and individuals. Although they may frame their activities as public, 
and although they constitute the focal points of matsuri and other collective events, the 
reality is that shrines are actors that operate within the postwar Japanese “religious market,” 
competing with other religious and commercial institutions for the patronage of individual 
“parishioners” and corporate sponsors.76 In fact, if it were not for the financial support from 
companies, many shrines would have even greater difficulty paying their employees and 
maintaining their buildings. 
Tanaka does not deny this reality. However, he does not see companies as private 
actors, but describes them as collective entities akin to local communities, both of which 
constitute the building blocks of Japanese society. Central to his argument is the notion 
of kyōdōtai, which refers to a community, but which literally means “collective body.” 
As Tanaka argues, most Japanese are part of such a local “collective body,” which can be 
experienced most directly during a matsuri, when people of all ages “become one body” 
by carrying a portable shrine (mikoshi 神輿) together. Ultimately, these local communities 
together constitute the “collective body” of the Japanese nation: the “shrine parish” (ujiko) 
73 Tanaka 2011, p. 15.
74 The term matsurigoto dates back to the ritsuryō 律令 system, the China-inf luenced system of state 
administration and ritual ceremonies implemented in the Nara period. Interestingly, it refers to both political 
administration and rituals. The term was reapplied in the Meiji period, and used to refer to the role of the 
emperor.
75 Tanaka 2011, p. 7.
76 See for example Reader and Tanabe 1998.
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to which “all Japanese belong.” This collective body is symbolically united by the imperial 
family, which constitutes its head.77 Although the political consequences are not necessarily 
the same, the similarity of these ideas to prewar kokutai 国体 (“national body”) ideology is 
significant; they point to an organicist understanding of nationhood that denies internal 
diversity and downplays historical contingencies. Moreover, they naturalize the imperial 
institution, by suggesting that the emperor is the head of the “body” that constitutes the 
Japanese nation.
Clearly, such views are of an inherently ideological nature and have potential political 
significance. For instance, they may be employed to justify various types of state patronage 
of Shinto shrines that are not available to Buddhist or Christian institutions. However, 
while hinting at such possible implications, Tanaka generally refrains from making 
explicitly political statements. The image of Shinto presented in his work—as in the work 
of Sonoda Minoru, as well as other contemporary Shinto scholars—is that of an ancient 
tradition of nature worship, intimately (even existentially) connected to the Japanese 
nation and its supposed physical territories; not of a modern, politically engaged religion. 
Significantly, these Shinto thinkers present Shinto not only as a “nature religion” (that is, 
a religion concerned with the worship of deities residing in natural elements), but also as 
a “natural religion” (that is, a religion that took shape “naturally” and “spontaneously” 
without the mediation of a historical founder).78 By describing Shinto in these terms, they 
dehistoricize and depoliticize it; as an essential, natural, and foundational aspect of Japanese 
culture and society, Shinto both predates and transcends modern categories such as “religion” 
and “politics.” This naturalization, I argue, is part and parcel of Shinto’s discursive 
secularization: by redefining Shinto as the “natural ground” underlying other cultural and 
religious practices, it is presented as Japan’s “immanent frame” that shapes the conditions of 
belief. Thus, Shinto is not beyond belief—it precedes it.
The implication of Tanaka’s argument is that discussions about shrine patronage 
in relation to the constitutional separation of state and religion rest on a serious category 
mistake: Shinto does not correspond to the modern category of “religion,” since this 
category was imposed by foreign occupation authorities rather than being grounded in “the” 
Japanese historical experience. There is perhaps some truth to this argument: after all, in 
contemporary Japan, there is a clear discrepancy between legal constructions of “religion” 
and daily-life uses of the term (or avoidance thereof ). As we know, shūkyō is a modern 
construct that does not cover the range of devotional and ritual practices taking place in 
the country. However, those criticizing the secularist state apparatus for being a modern 
construct typically fail to acknowledge that Shinto as it exists today is largely a modern 
invention as well, shaped in tandem with the modern state and its categories.79 Instead, they 
assert the transhistorical character of Shinto, arguing that it goes back to prehistoric times, 
when it took shape “spontaneously” in reaction to the natural environment. This Shinto is 
said to constitute both a natural and a foundational aspect of Japanese culture and society.
77 Tanaka 2011, p. 19.
78 Depending on the context, the adverb shizen ni 自然に can mean both “naturally” and “spontaneously.”
79 Kuroda 1981; Josephson 2012.
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Conclusion
Notions of Shinto as a tradition of nature worship—and, correspondingly, pleas for 
the protection of shrine forest land and shrine-based nature conservation practices—
are not at odds with an understanding of Shinto as the ancient spiritual tradition of the 
Japanese nation, which constitutes a single collective body. Quite the contrary: the Shinto 
environmentalist paradigm has turned out to be perfectly compatible with notions of 
a more outspokenly conservative and nationalist nature. One reason for this is that a 
professed concern for “nature,” “ecology,” and “environmental sustainability” can serve 
to provide legitimacy for various activities, in Japan as well as abroad, without necessarily 
leading to significant changes on a practical level. The increasing association of Shinto with 
these issues in recent years has led to much positive PR, and arguably contributed to the 
dissociation of Shrine Shinto from issues of a more explicitly ideological nature, including 
the lingering nostalgia for prewar imperialism and the historical revisionism displayed by 
the Yasukuni management and its powerful supporters. 
The paradigmatic status of this notion of Shinto as a nature religion is well exemplified 
by the fact that even the president of Jinja Honchō now writes that “the origin of Shinto is 
nature worship,” and that “the sacred grove constitutes the center of the local community.” 80 
After all, nature is public; moreover, it transcends historical particularities and human 
contingencies. To what extent Jinja Honchō and its leaders have become “truly” concerned 
with environmental problems is subject to ongoing debate, and I will not attempt to solve 
this issue now. In any case, they do appear to have embraced the notion of chinju no mori 
as sacred sites where meaningful and sustainable relationships are established between local 
communities, natural environments, and deities. According to Tanaka and like-minded 
Shintoists, it is through a renewed awareness of one’s local identity and belonging to a 
place—social as well as physical—that Japanese people can once again learn about “their” 
ancient traditions, which are characterized by a symbiotic relationship with the natural 
environment, as well as gratitude to the ancestors and the gods. Ultimately, the argument 
goes, this will lead to a moral renaissance, and to the rebirth of the nation.81
Thus, in this narrative, the signif icance of chinju no mori far transcends the 
two-dimensional state-religion dichotomy characteristic of postwar legal secularism. 
Contemporary Shinto ideologues such as Tanaka Tsunekiyo and Sonoda Minoru 
challenge this secular apparatus; as such, it appears justified to describe their position as 
“anti-secular.” However, it should be emphasized that ultimately, these Shinto leaders 
do not challenge the separation of religion and state per se. All they state is that modern 
notions of religion as primarily faith-based and individualistic do not accurately ref lect 
the historical reality of Shinto: a community religion shaped by the natural environment 
of the archipelago where it emerged. According to them, the legal category shūkyō, as it 
is defined by the Constitution, does not cover Shinto. While the Constitution defines 
religion as essentially a private affair, Shinto is fundamentally public and collective, they 
argue. Rather than challenging the separation of state and religion, therefore, contemporary 
Shinto leaders seek to reposition their tradition in the public realm. Thus, they do not wish 
to abolish the secular system—quite the contrary. Instead, they want to move Shinto from 
80 Tanaka 2011, pp. 10, 12.
81 Tanaka 2011, p. 19. See also Breen 2010b.
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the “private” realm of shūkyō (back) to the “public” or “secular” realm, which encompasses 
culture, heritage, and nature. Their claim is that Shinto’s place is in this world, even though 
it deals with gods: yet the gods matter here and now, to the entire collective body and the 
natural environment by which the collective is shaped. Thus, in Josephson’s terminology, 
these scholars seek to reestablish the “Shinto secular.” When perceived as such, the attempts 
to make Shinto public and dissociate it from “religion” can indeed be conceptualized as the 
discursive secularization of Shinto (but not, obviously, its decline).
Eventually, of course, this all boils down to the question of definition, which brings 
us back to the topic of this special issue, and the debates outlined previously. The concepts 
“secularism” and “secularization” are used differently by different interpreters, and have 
come to carry a range of meanings, which are not always made explicit by authors employing 
these terms. As I have pointed out, contemporary Shinto ideology may be seen as antithetic 
to secularism by some. Indeed, the attempts to challenge the constitutional restrictions 
on religious institutions and re-sacralize the public sphere may appear anti-secular at first 
sight. However, I have argued that these same attempts to reassert Shinto’s role in the 
public sphere may also be interpreted as a strategy to reestablish Shinto as a secular (that is, 
nonreligious) collective tradition. In this paper, I have referred to this strategy by the term 
“discursive secularization.”
When using the terms “secular” and “religious” to refer to Japanese ideology and 
practices, we need clear working definitions, and consistent application. Should we choose 
to define “secularity” as the absence of any reference to divine beings in public, Shinto 
most certainly is not secular. However, should we choose to define it as the this-worldly 
counterpart of a more transcendentally oriented “religion,” which in modern times has 
come to constitute the “immanent frame” by which the conditions of belief and disbelief are 
shaped, then Shinto is secular, at least in the perception of some of its leading ideologists, 
who actively argue for corresponding legal changes. Whichever approach we adopt, it is 
of crucial importance to realize that, although they may have been shaped in a “Western” 
historical context, “religion” and “the secular” have become very real societal categories 
in many societies worldwide (including Japan), and therefore cannot be discarded. Their 
meanings continue to be subject to negotiation and change, however. What counts as 
“secular” and “religious” is never fixed: these are normative concepts, not neutral analytical 
categories. One man’s secularism is another man’s religion.
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